Multiple Incorporation to Obtain Additional Accumulated Earnings Credits and Surtax Exemptions by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1960
Multiple Incorporation to Obtain Additional
Accumulated Earnings Credits and Surtax
Exemptions
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Multiple Incorporation to Obtain Additional Accumulated Earnings Credits and Surtax Exemptions"
(1960). Minnesota Law Review. 3196.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3196
Note
Multiple Incorporation
To Obtain Additional Accumulated
Earnings Credits and Surtax Exemptions
The Internal Revenue Code allows each corporation an
automatic surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit
in the computation of its taxes. A result of this has been a
trend toward conducting a single business through several
corporations instead of one. The author of this Note ana-
lyzes the common law and statutory weapons the Commis-
missioner of Taxation has to prevent multiple incorporation,
demonstrating how, until recently, they have been relatively
weak. He then discusses various legislative approaches to
the problem, concluding that only a subjective test can
provide the flexibility necessary to confine the surtax exemp-
tion and accumulated earnings credit to the purposes
expressed by the drafters of the Internal Revenue Code.
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code contains a temptation to conduct
businesses in multiple corporations because it excludes the first
$25,000 of corporate income from the twenty-two per cent surtax,'
and gives each corporation an automatic $100,000 accumulated earn-
ings credit.2 A business with a taxable income of $250,000 would be
able to reduce its income taxes by $49,500 per year by operating
through ten corporations instead of one.3 In addition, the business
1. In addition to the "normal tax" on corporate income, which is now a flat thirty
per cent, there is also a surtax of twenty-two per cent of all income in excess of
$25,000. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 535(c) (2). There is a tax of twenty-seven and one-
half per cent of the first $100,000 of accumulated taxable income, and of thirty-eight
and one-half per cent in excess of $100,000. INr. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 531. "Accu-
mulated Taxable Income" is defined in section 535 as "taxable income, adjusted in the
manner provided in subsection 531(b), minus the sum of the dividends paid deduc-
tion (as defined in section 561) and the accumulated earnings credit (as defined in
subsection (c))." The minimum accumulated earnings credit provided in section
535(c) (2) is $100,000.
3. Assuming that the $250,000 income was divided equally so that each corpora-
tion had only $25,000 taxable income, there would be no surtax on the total income
of the group. The tax rate would therefore be only thirty per cent, which would yield
a $75,000 tax. If the $250,000 was earned by one corporation there would be a
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could accumulate, tax free, up to $1,000,000. 4 The benefits of the
exemption and credit are much sought after,5 as evidenced by the
number of cases dealing with the use of multiple entities to reduce
taxes.0
There are two basic multiple corporation structures: the parent-
subsidiary relationship, in which one corporation holds controlling
interests in others; and the brother-sister "tie-in," where one in-
dividual, or group of individuals, owns the controlling shares in
several corporations.' The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has
twenty-two per cent surtax on $225,000 of it, or $49,500. Or, to put it another way,
each surtax exemption is worth $5,500, assuming there is a full $25,000 taxable
income in the corporation, and nine exemptions are worth $49,500.
4. This is the result of having ten $100,000 accumulated earnings credits instead
of one. Thus, the $49,500 tax savings explained in note 3 supra, can be augmented
by savings of twenty-seven and one-half per cent of $100,000 and t y-eight and
one-half per cent of the last $800,000- a total of $335,500. However, the accumu-
lated earnings tax is not a significant factor in debt financed corporations since
accumulating earnings of the corporation to retire the debt will satisfy the "reason-
able needs of the business" test of section 535(c) (1). See Asch, Tax Consideration in
Real Estate Syndication, 3 Viii. L. REv. 469, 480 (1958).
5. There are other tax advantages in conducting a business in multiple corporate
form besides the extra surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit: for
example, to avoid the "spin-off problem" of section 355, to permit the selection of
different accounting methods for different types of business conducted by the
common interests, and to minimize collapsible corporation problems. Driscoll,
Incorporating, in Multi-Corporate Form, an Existing Business, N.Y.U. 16TH INsr. oN
Fmu. TAx 248-53 (1958). See generally id. at 248-60. Also, there are situations where
splitting the business into several types of entities, such as partnerships and sole
proprietorships, might be advantageous. For example, during the period of excess
profits tax, the temptation was to split into partnerships to avoid the heavy tax on
excess corporate earnings. Because of the obvious similarity between multiple incor-
poration to obtain additional deductions and organization into several different types
of entities to avoid excess profits tax, the "multiple entity' cases are used inter-
changeably in this Note with multiple incorporation cases in discussing business
purpose and tax evasion.
6. See, e.g., cases listed in CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAx RFa'. 2266, 2993,
4914.
7. Each type of structure has several species. A multiple group can be divided
on a functional basis, so that corporation A handles manufacturing and corporation
B handles sales. Or, there can be a geographic division, with each corporation
handling both sales and manufacturing in different sections of the country. Two more
technical terms used by some writers, are "vertical" and "horizontal" organization.
In vertical organization, each related corporation is complete in its operations and
conducts a separate business. For example, a real estate tract may be developed
by several corporations, each developing one section of the tract. In horizontal
organization of a real estate development, one corporation would hold title to the
land, another build it, and a third sell it. See Driscoll, supra note 3; Mortenson,
The Multiple Attack on Multiple Corporations, 35 TAXES 647 (1957).
There are several ways to establish either type of multiple corporate structure.
For example, an individual may acquire the controlling stock in several corporations
or he may acquire stock of one corporation and split its assets among three newly-
created corporations. A corporation may acquire stock of existing corporations, or
can split off assets into new corporate subsidiaries. For a general discussion of the
various methods, see McCandless, Acquisition of Corporate Business with a View to
Subsequent Operations in Two or More Corporations, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAx
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many weapons, both statutory and common law, to use against
multiple incorporation. Until recently, however, these weapons have
been relatively weak due to restrictive judicial interpretation. The
purpose of this Note is to demonstrate the need for legislative
strengthening of the Commissioner's position. The Note will analyze
the present strength of the various devices available to the Com-
missioner and suggest legislative improvements.
I. THmoims UsED To PnEvr MurLnr~i Ico RATIoN
The weapons used against multiple incorporation are:8 1) The
sham theory. Under this common law theory the Commissioner seeks
to prove that in substance the corporation is a sham; he then argues
that it should be disregarded as a taxable entity even though its form
is recognized by local law. 2) Section 482.1 This section gives the
Commissioner discretion to allocate income, deductions, credits or
allowances among commonly controlled organizations if he deter-
mines it is necessary to prevent tax evasion, or to reflect clearly the
income of each of the related businesses. 3) Section 61.10 The Com-
missionerIs position is that even if the corporation is a taxable entity,
the challenged income was not in reality earned by the taxpayer, but
rather by a related entity. This is in effect an allocation of income
261 (1958). Several of these methods give rise to problems under sections of the
Code other than those discussed in this Note, particularly sections 351, 854, 355,
866 & 368.
8. The separation and order of presentation of these weapons is arbitrary since
they are inextricably intertwined. Together they are more powerful than individually,
as illustrated by Professor Landman's remark:
This situation is ominous. The danger is that a factual position under section 45
may be vulnerable under sections 45, 129 and 22(a) [sections 482, 269 and
61(a) of the 1954 Code], and the principle of substance versus form, as well
as the new sections 112(b)(11) and 15(c) [sections 355 and 1551 of the 1954
Code], jointly and severally.
Landiman, Multiplying Business Corporations and Acquiring Tax Losses, 8 TAx L.
REV. 81, 87 (1952). The Commissioner is well aware of this effect and often brings
all weapons to bear on a single case. See, e.g., John P. Wagner, 17 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 569 (1958).
9. SEC. 482. ALLOCATION OF INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS AMONG
TAXPAYERS.
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or
not afiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation
is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
This section is substantially similar to section 45 of the 1939 Code.
10. "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived ... " INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 61(a). This is the
same definition as contained in section 22(a) of the 1939 Code.
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among related taxpayers. 4) Section 269 (a) (1) .11 By this section the
Commissioner is empowered to deny deductions, credits or allow-
ances obtained as a result of the acquisition of control of a corpora-
tion, if the acquiring person or corporation is in control after the
11. SEC. 269. ACQUISITIONS MADE TO EVADE OR AVOID INCOME
TAX.
[See. 269(a)]
(a) IN GENA.-If-
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 8,
1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,
directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled, di-
rectly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by such acquiring
corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which property, in the hands of
the acquiring corporation, is determined by reference to the basis in the
hands of the transferor corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit,
or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy,
then such deduction, credit, or other allowance shall not be allowed. For pur-
poses of paragraphs (1) and (2), control means the ownership of stock possess-
ing at least 50 percent of the total combining voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock of the corporation.
[See. 269(b)]
(b) POWER OF SECRETARY OR His DELEGATE To ALLOW DEDUCnON, ETc., IN
PART. - In any case to which subsection (a) applies the Secretary or his delegate
is authorized -
(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any amount
disallowed by such subsection, if he determines that such allowance will not
result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acqui-
sition was made; or
(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute,
apportion, or allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit of
which was sought to be secured, between or among the corporations, or
properties, or parts thereof, involved, and to allow such deductions, credits,
or allowances so distributed, apportioned, or allocated, but to give effect to
such allowance only to such extent as he determines will not result in the
evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisition was
made; or
(3) to exercise his powers in part under paragraph (1) and in part under
paragraph (2).
[Sec. 269(c)]
(c) PRESUMPTION IN CASE OF DIsPRoPORIoNATE PURCiAsE PucE. - The
fact that the consideration paid upon an acquisition by any person or corporation
described in subsection (a) is substantially disproportionate to the aggregate-
(1) of the adjusted basis of the property of the corporation (to the extent
attributable to the interest acquired specified in paragraph (1) of subsection
(a)), or of the property acquired specified in paragraph (2) of subsection (a);
and
(2) of the tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the adjusted basis of
the property) not available to such person or corporation otherwise than as a
result of such acquisition,
shall be prima facie evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of
Federal income tax. This subsection shall apply only with respect to acquisitions
after March 1, 1954.
This section is the same as section 129 of the 1939 Code, with the exception of sub-
section (c), which was added by the 1954 Code.
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acquisition and the principal purpose for the acquisition was tax
evasion by securing the benefit of the deductions, credits or allow-
ances. 5) Section 269(a) (2) .12 This section allows denial of deduc-
tions, credits or allowances emanating from assets acquired from
another corporation, not controlled by the acquiring corporation, if
the basis of the assets "in the hands of the acquiring corporation is
determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor
corporation," and the principal purpose for acquiring the assets was
tax evasion. 6) Section 1551.11 If a corporation transfers assets, other
than cash, to a newly-formed corporation, or to a corporation not
actively engaged in business, the transferee corporation will be
denied the accumulated earnings credit and the surtax exemption
unless it can prove it is not controlled by the transferor or can prove
by a clear preponderance of the evidence that securing the exemp-
tion or credit was not the major purpose of the transfer. 7) Section
7701(a) (8). By this definitional section "the term 'corporation' in-
cludes associations, joint stock companies and insurance companies."
Relying on judicial definition of what constitutes an association tax-
able as a corporation, 14 the Commissioner argues that the relation-
ships, agreements and contracts between the component corporations
warrant treatment of the group as a single corporation for tax
purposes.
12. See note 11 supra.
13. SEC. 1551. DISALLOWANCE OF SURTAX EXEMPTION AND ACCU-
MULATED EARNINGS CREDIT.
If any corporation transfers, on or after January 1, 1951, all or part of its
property (other than money) to another corporation which was created for the
purpose of acquiring such property or which was not actively engaged in
business at the time of such acquisition, and if after such transfer the transferor
corporation or its stockholders, or both, are in control of such transferee corpo-
ration during any part of the taxable year of such transferee corporation, then
such transferee corporation shall not for such taxable year (except as may be
otherwise determined under section 269 (b)) be allowed either the $25,000
exemption from surtax provided in section 11(c) or the $100,000 accumulated
earnings credit provided in paragraph (2) or (3) of section 535 (c), unless
such transferee corporation shall establish by the clear preponderance of the
evidence that the securing of such exemption or credit was not a major purpose
of such transfer. For purposes of this section, control means the ownership of
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation. In determining the ownership of
stock for the purpose of this section, the ownership of stock shall be determined
in accordance with the provisions of section 544, except that constructive owner-
ship under section 544 (a) (2) shall be determined only with respect to the
individual's spouse and minor children. The provisions of section 269 (b), and
the authority of the Secretary under such section, shall, to the extent not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this section, be applicable to this section.
This section is the same as section 15(c) of the 1939 Code.
14. The word "association" has never been defined in the Code. Its definition has
been left to the regulations and the courts. The landmark case in this area is Mor-
rissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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A. Tnm Siv THEORY
Running through the law of taxation are two propositions: a tax-
payer has a right to minimize his potential tax burden by lawful
means ;15 and a person may select any form for the conduct of busi-
ness consistent with local law. 6 Any attempt to declare that an
entity is a sham, and therefore should be disregarded as a taxable
entity, runs contrary to these two traditional concepts. Initially
courts refused to adopt a theory that would disregard the corporate
entity. This is illustrated by Klein v. Board of Supervisors,17 where
the Supreme Court said, "The corporation is a person and its owner-
ship is a nonconductor that makes it impossible to attribute an in-
terest in its property to its members."' 8
Five years later, however, in Gregory v. Helvering,9 the Court
took the first step in adopting the sham theory. There, a taxpayer
who had manipulated securities through two of his controlled corpo-
rations was denied capital gains treatment in the exchanges on the
theory that the law will pierce sham transactions and ascertain their
real character. Then, in Higgins v. Smith,"° the Court held against a
taxpayer who sold securities to his controlled corporation and
claimed a loss on the sale. Finally, in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-
missioner,"' the Court constructed a test for the application of the
sham theory, saying "so long as that purpose [for formation of the
corporation] is the equivalent of business activities or is followed
by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation
remains a separate taxable entity. " 2 2 Judge Learned Hand has said
the "business purpose test" outlined in Gregory, Higgins and Moline
has sometimes been understood to contradict the doctrine that the motive
to avoid taxation is never, as such, relevant. In fact it does not trench upon
that doctrine; it merely declares that to be a separate jural person for pur-
poses of taxation, a corporation must engage in some industrial, commer-
cial, or other activity besides avoiding taxation: in other words, that the
term "corporation" will be interpreted to mean a corporation which does
some "business" in the ordinary meaning; and that escaping taxation is not
'business' in the ordinary meaning.23
Thus, so long as a corporation is actually performing some business
activity, it probably will be regarded as a taxable entity. 4 This makes
15. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
18. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473-77 (1940).
17. 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1980).
18. Id. at 24.
19. 293 U.S. 465 (1985).
20. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
21. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
22. Id. at 439.
23. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944).
24. The business purpose test for sham entities is often described as a subjective
[Vol. 44:485
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the application of the sham theory difficult and infrequent, since
usually it is possible for a taxpayer to show that some business was
carried on by the corporation.
However, in a case decided this past December, Aldon Homes,
Inc.,25 the Tax Court struck down as sham sixteen real estate devel-
opment corporations. The court recognized that each of the corpora-
tions held directors' meetings, adopted by-laws, issued stock and
prepared for the carrying on of business, but said that, in light of all
the circumstances present, these activities "were not the substantive
business activities which produced the income."28 The court also
disposed of several business purpose arguments of the taxpayer by
saying that they were "little more than mere recitals" by the witness
for the taxpayers. Thus, the court seems to be looking to the actual
functioning of the sixteen corporations, rather than the reasons for
their creation. And, the court, in requiring that the business activities
carried on by the corporations in question must be substantial busi-
ness activities,27 has changed the criterion of the sham theory. The
taxpayer must show more than one item of business activity to defeat
an accusation of being a sham entity.
If other decisions follow the reasoning of Aldon Homes, the sham
theory may be turned into an effective weapon against multiple in-
corporation. Even if this does not occur, however, the sham theory
still has vitality in the attack on multiple incorporations since its
test, as a test of the motives for forming the entity, or the purposes for which it was
formed. See, e.g., L. W. Tilden, Inc. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 704 (5th Cir.
1951); Twin Oaks Co. v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1950); John L.
Denning & Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1950); Estate of Julius
I. Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cuir. BuLL. 1; Miles-Conley Co., 10
T.C. 754 (1948), acq., 1948-2 Cum. BuLL., aff'd on other grounds, Miles-Conley
Co. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1949); Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C.
83 (1948), acq., 1948-1 Cur. Bvu. . 1; Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945),
acq., 1945 COvi. Bu_ . 6; John P. Wagner, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 569 (1958); Brost
Motors, Inc., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 806 (1948).
However, a close examination of these cases reveals that more often than not
courts are really using an objective test - did the entity perform any business
activity? In Buffalo Meter it was said, "the partners had what in their opinion were
sound business reasons for organizing the partnership. The important consideration
is that the partnership was real for all purposes and that it has at all times functioned
as an entirely separate economic entity." 10 T.C. at 89. (Emphasis added.) In Fried-
lander Corp. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1954), the court said that a
sham case cannot be decided on motives, it must be decided on whether its function
is sham. Friedlander is therefore consistent with National Carbide Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 422, 431-32 (1949), where the Supreme Court made it clear
that the business purpose test is satisfied if the corporation actually engages in
business activity. In Herbert v. Riddell, 103 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Cal. 1952), National
Carbide was interpreted to mean that as long as an entity has transacted one item
of business it cannot be disregarded.
25. 33 T.C. 339 (1959).
26. Id. at 352. (Emphasis added.)
27. Id. at 350.
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business purpose test, in varying degrees, has been incorporated into
sections 482, 269 and 1551.28
B. SECTION 482
Section 482 appears on its face to be the most powerful of the
weapons available to the Commissioner.29 It gives him discretion to
allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances among re-
lated entities, and the relation between the entities necessary to
invoke this discretionary power is simply that the entities are "con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the same interests. . . .- Thus,
actual, rather than legally enforceable, control is the criterion.
31
28. The three Code sections, 482, 269 and 1551, are all framed in terms of "tax
evasion"; if the entity was formed or acquired to evade taxes, it will suffer certain
results. Section 482 allows the Commissioner to determine when there has been
tax evasion, but a defense to his tax evasion determination is the existence of a
valid business purpose for the transaction. See notes 32-37 infra and accompanying
text. Section 269, on the other hand, says if the "principal purpose" of an acquisition
is tax evasion then the taxpayer loses benefits. Once again, business purpose has
been considered a defense. However, under the language of section 269 the taxpayer
probably must show more business purpose than under section 482. See notes 57-58
infra and accompanying text. Section 1551 has a "major purpose" tax evasion stand-
ard. This is quite clearly a more difficult test for the taxpayer to overcome-he
must show that business purposes were the only major purposes. See notes 78-79
infra and accompanying text. In addition, the sham theory has been used success-
fully in support of section 482 or 61. See, e.g., Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 196 F.2d 1006, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952); Commissioner v. Chel-
sea Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); Alpha Tank & Sheet Metal Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 878, 116 F. Supp. 721 (1953).
29. See note 9 supra.
30. lNT. BREv. CODE- oF 1954, § 482.
31. Texsun Supply Corp., 17 T.C. 433 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 4;
Grenada Indus., Inc., 17 T.C. 231 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873, cert. denied, 346
U.S. 819 (1953). See generally Cooper, Section 45, 4 TAx L. Rmv. 131 (1949).
"Actual control" is not easily defined, but its probable meaning is that type of
control which stems from a close relationship, either by family or friendship. If
stock in two corporations is divided among cousins and one of them is the dominant
executive in the operation of the business there probably would be no difficulty in
finding actual common control. In Grenada Industries, the same people were owners
of four entities, each in the same proportion, and the court held that the actual control
requirement of section 482 was met, even though the owners were not related.
But where a principal shareholder of a corporation formed a partnership with his
son and a third party, the tax court expressed doubt that actual control of the en-
tities was present. Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc. 16 T.C. 870 (1951), acq., 1951-2
CuM. BuLL. 2. And, where'a man owned half interest in an automobile dealership,
a half interest in one truck rental business and a third interest in another, the court
said the three organizations were not commonly controlled. Q. I. Roberts, 8 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 60 (1949) (dictum).
In Lake Erie & Pitt. Ry., 5 T.C. 558 (1945), acq., 1945 CuM. BULL. 5, the court,
relying on regulations under the 1939 Code, reasoned that if two corporations each
are fifty per cent shareholders in a third corporation neither has control and therefore
section 482 could not be applied to allocate gross income to the subsidiary from the
two parent corporations. The question raised by this decision is: Would it be possible
to avoid section 482 by an interlocking system of parents and subsidiaries in which
each subsidiary is half owned by two of the parents?
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In spite of its literal scope, section 482 has been narrowly con-
strued by the courts. First, the sham theory, with its business purpose
test,32 has been read into the section. If the taxpayer establishes that
its existence is not a sham, the Commissioner cannot use section 482
to allocate the entire gross income of the taxpayer to the related
entity, since to do so would be the equivalent of striking down the
entity as being sham.3 Because of the relative ease with which the
business purpose test may be met,3" the situations in which the Com-
missioner can successfully allocate all the gross income of an entity
are few. The courts have also been explicit in saying that net income
may not be allocated among related entities because this would be
using section 482 to effect a consolidation. 35 Added to these are two
other restrictions: the Commission cannot disallow deduction of
one entity, he must allocate them to the entities so entitled; 36 and
there can be no creation of income in transactions between related
entitiesW
32. See note 24 supra.
33. See Raymond Pearson Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.
1957); John L. Denning & Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1950);
Moke Epstein, Inc., 29 T.C. 1005 (1958), acq., 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 6; Stevens
Brothers, 24 T.C. 953 (1955), acq., 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 5; Polak's Frutal Works,
Inc., 21 T.C. 953 (1954), acq., 1955-1 CUm-. BULL. 6; Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 19
T.C. 259 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cxm'. BuLL. 6; Palm Beach Aero Corp., 17 T.C. 1169
(1952), acq., 1952-2 Cmri. BULL. 3; Estate of Julius I. Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234 (1951),
acq., 1952-1 Cmrr. BULL. 1; Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870 (1951),
acq., 1951-2 Cm'. BULL. 2; Miles-Conley Co., 10 T.C. 754 (1948), acq., 1948-2
Ctm!. BULL. 3; Buffalo Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948), acq., 1948-1 Cum. BUL=. 1;
Hugh Smith, Inc., 8 T.C. 660 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 173 F.2d 224, cert. denied,
337 U.S. 918 (1949); Forcum-James Co., 7 T.C. 1195 (1946), acq., 1948-1 Cum.
BuLL. 2; Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BUL=. 6; Briggs-
Killian Co., 40 B.T.A. 895 (1939), acq., 1940-1 Cum. B=rj. 1; Drawoh, Inc., 28
B.T.A. 666 (1933), nonacq., XII-2 Cm. BuLL. 19.
34. See note 24 supra.
35. E.g., Commissioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); J. E.
Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Tenn. 1951) (semble); Estate of
Julius I. Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234 (1951), acq., 1952-2 Cm'. BuLL.. 1; Cedar Valley Distil-
lery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 2; Miles-Conley Co.,
10 T.C. 754 (1948), acq., 1948-2 Cum. BuLL. 3, aff'd on other grounds, 173 F.2d
958 (4th Cir. 1949); Seminole Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum.
BurL. 6.
36. Hypotheek Land Co. v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1952); Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 29 T.C. 989 (1958); General Indus. Corp., 35 B.T.A. 615 (1937), acq.,
1937-1 Cur. BULL. 10.
Although the general theory is that section 482 cannot be used to disallow deduc-
tions, the section has been successfully used by the Commissioner to reduce the basis
of an asset received from a related entity, which in effect disallows a loss on the sub-
sequent sale of the asset. National See. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.
1943); G.U.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941). It is suggested
that these cases are examples of the use of section 482 to strike down fictitiously cre-
ated deductions, whereas in the cases cited above the deductions were of the arm's
length type, were not sham, and therefore could only be allocated and not disallowed.
37. Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940 ;
Epsen Lithographers, Inc. v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181 (D. Neb. 1946); Texsun Sup
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The result of these judicial restrictions is that section 482 has been
relegated to the role of a policeman of transactions and arrange-
ments between related entities. Its sole function is to keep these
transactions equivalent to dealings between unrelated parties. ss
Therefore, section 482 cannot be used to sweep through a multiple
corporation group and remove the total benefit of the extra ex-
emptions and credits. Instead, it can only be used to minimize the
benefit by confining earnings and income deductions to the entities
that properly deserve them.
This is not to say that section 482 may be disregarded as a weapon
against multiple incorporation. The discretionary power of the Com-
missioner to determine what allocations are necessary to keep things
on an arm's length basis means that, once such a determination is
made, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the Commissioner
ply Corp., 17 T.C. 433 (1951), acq., 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 4; Smith-Bridgman & Co.,
16 T.C. 287 (1951), acq., 1951-1 Cum. BuLL. 3; Hugh Smith, Inc., 8 T.C. 660
(1947), acq., 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 4, aff'd per curiam, 173 F.2d 224 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 87 U.S. 918 (1949); E. C. Laster, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), acq., 1941-1 Cum.
BULL. 7.
38. The legislative history and contemporary understanding of section 482 are dis-
cussed in Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 645 (1935). It is clear from Asiatic that even before most of the judicial in-
terpretation of section 482, the section was considered to be only a policeman of
transactions between commonly controlled entities, not authority to disregard the
existence of entities. For a more thorough discussion see Mortensen, The Multiple
Attack on Multiple Corporations, 35 TAXES 647, 651 (1957); Cooper, Section 45, 4
TAx L. RBv. 131, 132--34 (1949).
Subsequent cases have explicitly stated the purpose of section 482 to be the main-
tenance of parity between controlled and uncontrolled entities. See, e.g., Central
Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
674 (1952); Epsen Lithographers, Inc. v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181 (D. Neb. 1946);
Lake Erie & Pitt. Ry., 5 T.C. 558 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL. 5.
For examples of transactions to which section 482 has been successfully applied
by the Commissioner, see Birmingham Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Davis, 112 F.2d 453
(5th Cir. 1940); Oppenheim's, Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Mich. 1950);
The Hearst Corp., 14 T.C. 575 (1950), acq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 2; Glenmore Dis-
tilleries Co., 47 B.T.A. 213 (1942), acq., 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 8; Joseph J. Harris, Inc.,
5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 480 (1946).
The business purpose test again comes into play when the Commissioner claims
that a certain expense or deduction should be shifted, the taxpayer arguing that the
expense or deduction was justified by business reasons. See, e.g., Hypotheek Land Co.
v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1952); Essex Broadcasters, Inc., 2 T.C.
523 (1943), acq., 1948 Cum. BULL. 7.
Similarly, impossibility can be a defense to section 482. See L. E. Shunk Latex
Prods., Inc., 18 T.C. 940 (1952), nonacq., 1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 7, where a manu-
facturing corporation selling to a related partnership had to keep its prices at war-
time price ceilings, but the partnership hadno price ceiling on its resale of the goods.
The court held that the Commissioner could not allocate any of the partnership's ex-
traordinarily high profits to the corporation on the theory that the price paid by
the partnership to the corporation, though below market value due to the ceiling,
was a fair price because it was set by the government. It would have been impossible
to sell to the partnership at any other price and therefore it would be unfair to make
the corporation report any part of the profit realized by the partnership.
One area in which the business purpose argumqnt is of no avail to the taxpayer is
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was arbitrary and unreasonable in his determination. 9 This makes
the section effective in its job of policeman and at least insures that
the entities are conducted as truly distinct units by their controlling
interests. Not only does this deter fictitious shifting of income, ex-
penses or deductions but also it causes higher expenses in the main-
tenance of a multiple group, since separate accounting records,
minute books, production records and payroll records must be kept.40
Thus, section 482 contributes significantly to the establishment of a
point of diminishing returns from the multiplication of corporations.
At least one court has reasoned that section 482 does, and should,
allow the consolidation of commonly controlled entities if they are
engaged in related trades or businesses. In Advance Mach. Exch.,
Inc. v. Commissioner,4 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated that the purpose of section 482 is to prevent tax evasion by
any arbitrary shifting of income, and "there is no exception, nor any
reason for excepting, from this purpose the case where such arbitrary
allocation of income is among affiliated corporations who could,
under section 141,42 consolidate their respective incomes." 4 The
court used the sham theory to buttress its reasoning, saying that only
one entity really earned the income, and therefore it all should be
allocated to the true income producer. Although this reasoning
would seem to be that of a section 61 attack, rather than section 482,
the transfer of partially completed construction contracts to another entity, which on
completion of the contract realizes all the profit on the project, claiming this to be
proper under a contract completion accounting system. Even though a valid business
purpose for the transfer can be shown, the Commissioner has been upheld in allo-
cating the profit on the project between the transferor entity and the transferee. E.g.,
Dillard-Walternire, Inc. v. Campbell, 255 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1958); Standard Pav-
ing Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860
(1951); Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir.
1946).
39. E.g., Leedy-Glover Realty & Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.
1950); Oppenheim's Inc. v. Kavanagh, 90 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Epsen
Lithographers, Inc. v. O'Malley, 67 F. Supp. 181 (D. Neb. 1946); Briggs-Killian Co.,
40 B.T.A. 895 (1939), acq., 1940-1 Ctmn. BuLL. 1; Welworth Realty Co., 40 B.T.A.
97 (1939), acq., 1939-2 Cum. Bu.tL. 39.
The Commissioner's discretionary power therefore limits the scope of review by
the courts. They cannot review de novo, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit has said that there can be reversal of the Commissioner only if it is shown there
was no rational basis for his action. Dillard-Waltermire, Inc. v. Campbell, 255 F.2d
433 (5th Cir. 1958). But see Raymond Pearson Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d
509 (5th Cir. 1957), where the same court seems to disregard the rational basis test
even though it claims to apply it.
40. The expenses involved in maintaining separate records can be significant, es-
pecially in the maintenance of separate payrolls. In states where there is an unem-
ployment compensation fund, with employer contributions based on an experience
rating, new corporations automatically take the highest rate for one or more years.
This could mean an added expense of up to 2.7% of the payroll of the new corporation.
41. 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952).
42. Section 141 has been carried into the 1954 Code in sections 1501-05 (dealing
with conditions under which related entities may file consolidated income tax returns).
43. 196 F.2d at 1009.
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the court explicity says it is relying on section 482 alone.44 The
obscurity of the exact nature of the Advance Machinery holding is
illustrated by Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, Inc.4' There the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in holding for the taxpayer,
classified the section 482 discussion in Advance Machinery as "essen-
tially dicta," 46 and also said that the Advance Machinery interpreta-
tion was not in accord with either the language or the legislative
purpose of section 482.
However, in Alpha Tank & Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. United
States,47 a later case, the Court of Claims disallowed the rentals paid
by a manufacturing corporation to a corporation owning the plant
facilities where both corporations were controlled by the same in-
terests. The effect of the disallowance was allocation of the entire
gross income of the real estate corporation back to the manufacturing
corporation, and the elimination, for all practical purposes, of the
real estate corporation. Although section 482 is not explicitly men-
tioned in the opinion, it would appear that the court used the same
combination of section 482 and the sham theory as employed in
Advance Machinery.48
The theory expressed in Advance Machinery and Alpha Tank
seems to be that section 482 should be interpreted in its broadest
sense. In the opinion of these two courts, section 482 can be used to
disallow transactions among related entities even if they are equiva-
lent to arm's length transactions between unrelated parties, and even
though the net effect is to establish one taxable entity. This is the
same as giving the Commissioner discretion to determine if and
when an entity is a sham, which in turn would place on the taxpayer
the burden of proving the Commissioner's determination to be
arbitrary and unreasonable.49 It is manifest that this burden would
be more difficult than the meeting of an allegation of sham existence,
as would be the procedure if the Commissioner used the common
law sham theory. 0 In addition, the Court of Claims in Alpha Tank
44. Ibid. The Tax Court in Advance Mach. Exch., Inc., 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 84
(1949), held the Commissioner's determination to be proper under section 61. Also,
it is clear that the Tax Court viewed all but one of the entities to be sham-that
there was only one real entity. Yet, the Court of Appeals affirmed, it said, entirely
on the basis of section 482, adding that it was therefore not necessary to discuss
section 61.
45. 197 F.2d 620 (Sd Cir. 1952).
46. Id. at 623, n.6.
47. 126 Ct. Cl. 878, 116 F. Supp. 721 (1953).
48. Advance Machinery and Alpha Tank are cited with approval in James Realty
Co. v. United States, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. fr 9660 (D. Minn. 1959). However, James
Realty is a section 269 case and the citations are only for general support.
49. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
50. If the Commissioner determines that a taxpayer's tax return is deficient be-
cause of siphoning-off income to a sham entity, there is the normal presumption that
the Commissioner was correct in his determination. The taxpayer must meet this
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characterizes the business purpose test as a subjective inquiry; it
would look to the motives for the formation of the separate entity,
rather than the activities performed by the entity.51 Such a subjec-
tive criterion would make it even more difficult to show that the
Commissioner's determination was arbitrary and unreasonable. It
would complete the transformation of section 482 into a broad,
powerful weapon against multiple incorporation.
C. S ON 61
Closely intertwined with the sham theory and section 482 is sec-
tion 61 and its definition of income.52 Here, the Commissioner, in-
stead of focusing his attack on splitting or shifting of income to the
taxpayer from a related entity, concentrates on whether the taxpayer
actually performed the services that earned the income. It is perhaps
questionable whether section 61 should be turned to such a task.s
Nevertheless, the Commissioner has had some recent success with
section 61, 4 and this has put some new strength into his position.
It may be that the increasing acceptance of section 61 is an indica-
tion of a general willingness by the courts to listen to anti-multiple
incorporation arguments. A court may feel it is bound by precedent
under the sham theory and section 482 but that it is not so bound in
the use of section 61. This section could provide an avenue of escape
from prior judicial restrictions on section 482 and the sham theory.
presumption, but this is no more than saying the taxpayer has the burden of per-
suasion. The burden of proving the Commissioner's determination was arbitrary is
far more difficult to carry than proving him wrong. See note 39 supra and accom-
panying text.
51. We find no legitimate corporate business motive was involved in the or-
ganization of Delmo. The transfer of the plant to it and the lease back to plain-
tiff were integral parts of the same transaction. The attempted creation of
deductions for rentals of a plant when there was no real change in ownership in
the circumstances of this case is not a sufficient business motive.
126 Ct. CL at 883, 116 F. Supp. at 724. (Emphasis added.)
52. See note 10 supra.
53. Professor Landman has been critical of the judicial legislation under section
61. Landman, Multiplying Business Corporations and Acquiring Tax Losses, 8 TAx
L. RBu. 81, 90-92 (1952); Landman, Being Tax-WVise and Otherwise in Multiplying
Business Entities, 30 TAxEs 893, 903 (1952). He points out that section 61 could not
have been intended to do the job of section 482, since section 482 was enacted after
section 61 (1921 and 1913, respectively).
Nevertheless, the theory that income is taxable only to him who earns it is well
established in the case law. E.g., United States v. Joliet & C. R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The use of section 61 against multiple in-
corporation may appear to be illogical from a reading of the section but because of
this long established judicial theory it has some reason behind it- it is a logical ex-
tension even though the original use of the theory may have been wrong.
54. In Advance Machinery the Tax Court had used section 61 to aggregate all the
income into one entity. The court perhaps did this because it felt section 482 was
limited by judicial precedent. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit chose to
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D. SECnON 269
Like section 482, section 269'5 has broad language but has been
narrowly applied. Subsection (a) (1) was primarily designed to
eliminate the acquisition of loss carry-over corporations, whereas
subsection (a) (2) was designed to stop the trading in high basis,
low value assets that gave desirable excess profits credits and depre-
ciation deductions to the acquiring corporation. 6 The pivotal test
of the section is whether the acquisitions were principally motivated
by tax evasion purposes. This could be considered a codification of
the sham theory, but in its application it is one step further. The
statutory language indicates that the business purpose test (for tax
evasion) is to be subjective,57 and that more than a minimal amount
of business purpose must be present before the principal purpose is
no longer tax evasion. Although this test would seem to require a
greater amount of business purpose than under the sham theory and
section 482,58 it has not been difficult to meet. The courts have usually
refused to apply section 269 whenever a small amount of business
purpose is proved. 9 In an effort to stem this liberal attitude and
disregard precedent under section 482 and used that section rather than section 61 to
affirm the Tax Court. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, speaking in Chel-
sea Products, expressed the opinion that the Tax Court approach in Advance Ma-
chinery, was the correct one for that fact situation. Thus, one court of appeals and
the Tax Court approve of the use of section 61 in at least some cases where section
482 is not applicable due to its judicial restriction. It may be, though, that the Tax
Court's view has changed and that it now considers section 61 to have the same lim-
itations as section 482. See John P. Wagner, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 569, 608-09
(1958).
55. See note 11 supra.
56. For a thorough review of the legislative history and original purposes of the
section, see Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Comnmissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 296 U.S. 645, affirming 31 B.T.A. 1152 (1935); 7 MERarEs, FEnmiAL INco-m
TAxA-oN § 38.65 (1956); Mandell, Acquisition to Avoid Tax, N.Y.U. 16ra INst.
ON FrD. TAx 891 (1958); Mortenson, The Multiple Attack on Multiple Corporations,
35 TA XEs 647 (1957); Rice, Internal Revenue Code, Section 269: Does the Left Hand
Know What the Right Is Doing?, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 579 (1955).
For some early opinions on section 269, before it had judicial interpretation, see
Barnard, Acquisitions for Tax Benefit, 34 CALIF. L. RE:v. 36 (1946); Rudick, Acqui-
sitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 58 HARv. L. Rxv. 196 (1944). Mr. Rudick's article contains a chronological
history of section 269, giving the step by step development of the section through
the House and Senate. Id. at 200-06. It also has an interesting appendix showing
how the final section differed from several earlier versions. Id. at 224.
57. Under section 269, the test is whether there was a business purpose, as op-
posed to business activity. This differs from the test under the sham theory and sec-
tion 482. See note 24 supra.
58. As pointed out in note 24 supra, any amount of business activity will defeat
an allegation of being a sham entity. Thus, if the function of a corporation is ninety-
nine per cent tax evasion and one per cent legitimate business, the sham theory can-
not be used to strike down the corporation. But where the test is "principal purpose7
it would be logical to assume that only one per cent business function would not be
a successful defense to section 269.
59. See Commissioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952),
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revive the effectiveness of the section, Congress in 1954 added sub-
section (c), which creates prima facie evidence of tax avoidance
where the purchase price of the corporation is substantially dispro-
portionate to the sum of the basis of the assets acquired plus the
value of the tax benefits received.60 It is not clear what additional
help the presumption could give the Commissioner, since his deter-
minations are always presumed correct; "prima facie" evidence
would not strengthen this presumption. 1
In addition to the limitations imposed on section 269 by the busi-
ness purpose test, two other judicial inroads have contracted the
scope of the section. It has been held that section 269 cannot be used
to deny deductions, credits or allowances of the acquired corpora-
tion. 2 And, the deduction, credit or allowance sought to be disal-
lowed from the acquiring corporation must have resulted from the
acquisition of control; if the taxpayer would have had the deduction
regardless of its acquiring another entity the deduction cannot be
denied.63 An application of this theory is that a loss corporation can
acquire a profitable corporation and apply its loss carry forwards to
the future earnings of the profitable business. 4 A third limitation is
affirming 16 T.C. 840 (1951), nonacq., 1951-2 CuM. BuLL. 5; J. E. Dilworth Co. v.
Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (D. Tenn. 1951); WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952), acq.,
1954-2 CUM. BuLL. 6; Berland's, Inc. of South Bend, 16 T.C. 182 (1951), acq.,
1951-2 Cum. BULL. 1; Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951), acq., 1951-2 CuM.
BuLL. 1; A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (1950), acq., 1950-2 CuM. BuLL. 1;
Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411 (1948).
For cases in which the taxpayer failed to establish sufficient business purpose, see
Elko Realty, 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958); American Pipe &
Steel Corp., 25 T.C. 351 (1955), aff'd, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1957).
60. See note 11 supra. Congress also enacted sections 381 and 382 to give the
Commissioner some specific weapons against tax loss carry-over acquisitions because
section 269 had proven so ineffective. Arent, The Impact of the Coastal Oil Decision
Upon Loss Corporations, 8 J. TAXATION 14 (1958).
61. See 7 MErTENS, FEnmaiL INcOME TAXATION § 38.69, at 156-59 (1956). Also,
"the facts which cause the presumption to arise are usually not robative of the pro-
hibited principal purposes" and "this presumption is wholly futie and may be sum-
marily ignored." Cuddihy, Tax, Legal & Practical Considerations in Acquisition of a
Loss Corporation, U. So. CAr.. 1958 TAx. INST. 303, 320. Further, subsection (c)
does not apply to cororate split-offs because the subsidiary usually gives all its stock
for the assets received, which means the value of the consideration paid is the same
as value of the assets. Rice, Internal Revenue Code, Section 269: Does the Left Hand
Know What the Right Is Doing?, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 579, 586 (1955).
62. E.g., British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1958), nonacq., 1959-
1 Cum. BurL. 6; T.V.D. & Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957); WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952).
acq., 1954-2 Ctm. Bur_. 6; A.B. & Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842 (1950), acq., 1950-
2 Cium. BuLL 1; Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948) (dictum). In T.V.D. the
court said:
It is manifest from the unambiguous terms of section 129 [section 269 of the
1954 Code] that it applies only to an acquiring corporation and does not apply
to an acquired corporation.
27 T.C. at 886.
63. E.g., Commodores Point Terminal Corp., 11 T.C. 411 (1948), acq., 1949-1
Cum. Bur . 1.
64. E.g., British Motor Car Distribs., Ltd., 31 T.C. 437 (1948), acq. 1949-1 Cum.
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the theory that section 269 does not apply to the creation of new
corporations, and therefore corporate split-ups into new corpora-
tions, or launching of a new business in multiple corporate form are
not within the purview of section 269.65
These limitations of section 269 could prevent it from being effec-
tive against multiple incorporation to obtain additional surtax ex-
emptions and accumulated earnings credits.66 When a corporation
acquires nine other corporations, and none is a sham, the extra nine
exemptions and credits cannot be denied, since they belong to the
acquired corporations, which would have had them regardless of the
common control of the group. Furthermore, if a corporation creates
BULL. 1. The argument to allow a loss corporation to acquire a profit making corpo-
ration and apply the loss carry forwards to the future profits is that the loss corpo-
ration would have had the carry forwards regardless of its acquiring the profit corpo-
ration. The Commissioner counter argues that the profits activated the loss carry
forwards and therefore the loss corporation acquired the benefit of the loss carry for-
wards as a result of obtaining the profit corporation. The Tax Court's reply to this
is that the loss corporation did not acquire profits, it only acquired the possibility of
making a profit, and this "benefit which may flow to the new stockholders is too ten-
uous a benefit to bring section 129 [section 269 of the 1954 Code] into play." Id. at
440. See generally 7 MERTENs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 88.67 (1956); Cuddihy,
Tax, Legal and Practical Considerations in Acquisition of a Loss Corporation, U. So.
CAL. 1958 TAx INST. 303; Mandell, Acquisitions to Avoid Tax, N.Y.U. 16ra INsT. ON
FED. TAx 891 (1957)..
On the other hand, where a profit corporation acquires a loss corporation, section
269 would be in point, since the profit corporation is actually acquiring the loss carry
forward. Thus, there is a great difference in result depending on which corporation
is the acquiring corporation.
65. This theory was argued by the taxpayer in Berland's Inc. of South Bend, 16
T.C. 182 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 1, and in Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C.
75 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 1. However, the point was not discussed in
either case because the court found there was no principal purpose of tax evasion,
thereby mooting the question of whether section 269 is applicable to creation of new
corporations. In J. E. Dilworth v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Tenn. 1951) it
was said:
Section 129 [section 269 of the 1954 Code] . . . applies only to a situation where
one corporation or one individual acquires new assets. Said section was enacted
to prevent a corporation that had large earnings from acquiring another corpo-
ration that had large capital tax exemptions, thereby reducing the acquiring cor-
poration's excess profits tax. Section 129 does not apply . . . where no new
assets are acquired by the plaintiff.
The theory that acquisition does not include creation of a new corporation has been
accepted by several writers. E.g., Chase, An Analysis of Section 129 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 421, 434 (1945); Mortenson, The Multiple Attack
on Multiple Corporations, 35 TAXEs 647, 656 (1957). See also 2 C.C.H. 1960 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. 2266.06.
66. Although section 269 was passed with specific purposes in mind (see note 56
supra and accompanying text), it seems clear from reading the Senate Finance Com-
mittee report that the section was to apply to all types of tax avoidance made possible
by acquisitions of other corporations. See S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1944), 1944 CUM. BULL. 978, 1016-18. See also the authorities cited in note 56
supra.
nine new subsidiaries, then section 269 is inapplicable on two theo-
ries-the exemption of an acquired corporation cannot be denied,
and section 269 does not apply to creation of a corporation.
Although these limiting concepts are embedded in the case law
interpreting section 269, several courts have recently refused to ac-
cept them. In Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner 67 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that the
deductions of the acquired corporation cannot be disallowed. The
court reasoned that section 269 (a) (1) prevents the acquiring corpo-
ration from receiving the benefit of the extra deductions, and, unless
the acquired corporation is denied the use of its surtax exemption
and excess profit credit, the parent would benefit by obtaining extra
income from the subsidiary. The court also expressed the view that
subsection (a) (2) applies where a parent transfers property to a
subsidiary because the property is what makes possible the earning
of income by the subsidiary, thus activating the surtax exemption
and giving the parent more net income on its assets. Although the
reasoning under subsection (a) (2) is subject to a logical attack,6 8
the interpretation of subsection (a) (1) has compelling force.6 9 A
recent district court case, James Realty Co. v. Commissioner,0 fol-
lows the Coastal Oil reasoning on subsection (a) (1) and also dis-
poses of another limiting theory-that "acquisition" does not in-
clude "creation" - by saying "there is no settled view that 'acquisi-
tion of control' cannot and should not include the organization of a
new corporation. .... 71
The third limiting concept-that to deny the deduction it must
have stemmed from the acquisition of control-was dealt an
oblique blow by Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson,72 a 1959 case.
In Mill Ridge, control of a loss corporation was obtained by three
individuals who had also acquired a lucrative contract for shipping
oil. The individuals turned the contract over to the loss corpora-
tion, which had discontinued all former business. When the corpora-
tion applied its loss carry forwards to the profits made from this
contract, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions, using section
269. In sustaining the Commissioner, the court referred to the use of
67. 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
68. E.g., 43 VA. L. R-v. 1134, 1138 (1957).
69. Apparently Professors Surrey and Warren believe the Coastal Oil reasoning on
subsection (a) (1) is correct. See their comment on James Realty Co. v. United
States, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9660 (D. Minn. 1959) in CCH FFD. TA X, Curmam=
LAw & PNAcTim 1 1183 (11-59).
70. 59-2 U.S. Tax Gas. ff 9660 (D. Minn. 1959).
71. Id. at 73, 685.
72. 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959).
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the carry forwards as foreign to the "spirit" of section 269 and to its
"clearly expressed over all purpose and intent." It recognized that
technically section 269 might be inapplicable but the court would
not let such technicality thwart the spirit of the section. However,
the court also relied on Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler,3 where it was
held that tax loss carry forwards of individual brother-sister corpora-
tions could not be used, after they had combined into one corpora-
tion, to reduce post-merger profits. If the court had used only section
269, instead of dual grounds for its decision, Mill Ridge would be a
landmark case in the development of section 269.
The Coastal Oil, James Realty and Mill Ridge decisions may well
be the portent of future judicial reconstruction of section 269. When
viewed alongside Advance Machinery and Alpha Tank, and the re-
cent section 61 cases, they make it clear that courts are beginning
to lend a more sympathetic ear to the arguments of the Commission-
er for halting multiple incorporations. Emerging from these deci-
sions seems to be this line of reasoning: sections 482 and 269 should
not be restricted by narrow construction of the statutory language,
and the business purpose defense to tax evasion should not be as
easily established as prior decisions have permitted.74
E. SECTION 1551
Section 155171 is the only section in the code that deals specifi-
cally with multiple incorporation. It was enacted in 1951 to stop
corporations from transferring assets, with the accompanying busi-
ness income, to subsidiary corporations in order to obtain extra
surtax exemptions and accumulated earnings credits."6 Thus, the
73. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
74. Both in Coastal Oil and James Realty there would appear to be sufficient busi-
ness purpose present to avoid § 269, at least under the Tax Court case law. In Coast-
al Oil, the subsidiary corporation was formed to take over government contract busi-
ness, separating it out from the private rental business of the parent. James Realty
involves brother-sister corporations in real estate developments, where limitation of
liability arid increased ability to borrow money as a result of such limitation are
normal business considerations. Professors Surrey and Warren seem to be of the
opinion that there is sufficient business purpose present in James Realty to defeat §
269. See their comments following the case in CCH FED. TAx., Ctm=BI LAw &
PRACTICE. ff 1183 (11-59). However, in both cases the court quickly found tax evasion
to be the principal purpose of the subsidiary, indicating that courts are beginning to
require more business purpose.
75. See note 13 supra.
76. See 7 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 38.71 (1956); Emmanuel, Sec-
tion 15(c): New Teeth for the Reluctant Dragon?, 8 TAx L. REv. 457 (1953); Kahn,
Parent-Subsidiary Corporations, N.Y.U. 16TH INsT. ON FED. TAX 315 (1958); Mc-
Candless, Acquisition of Corporate Business with a View to Subsequent Operations in
Two or More Corporations, N.Y.U. 16xr INsT. ON FED. TAX 261 (1958); Mortenson,
The Multiple Attack on Multiple Corporations, 35 TAXs 647 (1958).
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section is narrow in its scope, applying only to parent-subsidiary
multiple incorporation, and then only if there is eighty per cent
control present.77 However, within this specific area it is effective
because the section requires that a subsidiary which has received
assets, other than cash, from its parent must prove by a clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the acquiring of tax benefits was
not a major purpose of the transfer.
The major purpose test and clear preponderance burden impose
on the subsidiary an almost impossible task. Since there can be
several major purposes for the creation of a subsidiary 8 a literal
reading of the section would require the subsidiary to prove that the
transfer was almost entirely motivated by business reasons,79 and
this is to be shown by a clear preponderance of the evidence. The
few cases decided under section 1551 show no inclination by the
courts to emasculate the major purpose test, as was done with the
principal purpose test of section 269.0
77. If a parent has only seventy-nine and one-half per cent of the voting stock of
another corporation it can transfer assets to the other corporation without fear of
section 1551. This is a definite limitation since corporations that own close to eighty
per cent control of a subsidiary would probably reduce their control to seventy-nine
and one-half per cent before transferring any assets. The percentage level of control
at which it would be better for the parent to risk section 1551 liability is dependent
on the income potential of the subsidiary, the attitude of the shareholders toward
having outside" owners, and the possibility of a successful defense to section 1551
under the major purpose test. ,,s,,
However, changing the percentage of control could "trap" the parent-subsidiary
into section 1551 liability. If the control is below eighty per cent when the assets are
transferred but later is increased to eighty per cent, the subsidiary will be denied the
surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit as of the year in which the con-
trol reached or surpassed eighty per cent. Kahn, Parent-Subsidiary Corporations, N.Y.
U. 16r INsT. O N FED. TAx: 315, 320-22 (1958). Another trap lies in the leasing of
property by the parent to the subsidiary; this probably will be considered a transfer
of assets. Ibid.
A possible way to avoid section 1551 is suggested by Airlene Gas Co. v. United
States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 7f 9805 (W.D. Ky. 1958). There a corporation sold assets
to its shareholders, who then transferred them to a new corporation. The court held
section 1551 was not applicable.
78. See Contract Battery Mfg. Co. v. Tomlinson, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 7f 9655 (S.D.
Fla. 1958).
79. The taxpayer would have to prove that none of the several major purposes was
tax evasion. Thus, only a small amount of tax consideration can be involved in estab-
lishing a subsidiary.
Note also that the test here, as under section 269, is phrased subjectively. For a
general discussion of the business purpose test of section 1551 see Note, 44 VA. L.
REV. 443, 446-47 (1958).
80. See Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957);
Central Valley Management Corp. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Cal.
1958); Theater Concessions, Inc., 29 T.C. 754 (1958), acq., 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 8.
For an example of a victory by the taxpayer-in a jury trial-see Contract Bat-
tery Mfg. Co. v. Tomlinson, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 7f 9655 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Because of the power of section 1551, its indiscriminate use by the
Commissioner could deter legitimate business expansion. However,
the Senate Finance Committee indicted that section 1551 was not
intended to prevent genuine expansion, only split-offs of existing
business."'
F. Tim AssocIATioN THEORY
The Commissioner has another argument against multiple incor-
poration; the "association theory" under section 7701 (a) (3). The
association theory, in general, is that if individuals voluntarily asso-
cite themselves together and conduct a business enterprise for
profit in a manner and in a form resembling that of a corporation,
they will be taxed as corporation, regardless of the avowed form
they have adopted . 2 The basic requirements of the theory-con-
duct of a business venture for profit and resemblance to corporate
activity -were laid down by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
Commissioner.3 The case involved the formation of a trust for the
purpose of the development and operation of a real estate project.
In holding that there was an association, the Supreme Court listed
the factors to be considered in determining if there is resemblance
to a corporation: 1) the purpose of the group or venture; 2) whether
there is continuity of the enterprise on death of the beneficial mem-
bers; 3) the presence of centralized management or direction; 4)
limitation of personal liability of the members; 5) ease of transfer-
ability of the interests of the members; 6) the holding of title of
the assets by the association, rather than by the individuals involved.
Presumably, the Commissioner's argument of the association
theory in the context of a multiple corporate structure would be
that the related corporations compose a group of "individuals" vol-
untarily associated in a business venture, and conducting the venture
in a form resembling that of a corporation. The Commissioner would
point to the agreements and dealings between the related corpora-
tions to prove the Morrissey factors are present. According to Pro-
fessor Surrey, the Commissioner has been using this attack mainly
against brother-sister corporations in the real estate field,8 4 but it
81. Jonerr COMuTTriEE STAFF SuMRY OF PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE Act OF
1951, 1951-2 CuM. BULL. 287, 303-04.
Nevertheless, one writer has concluded that the long range effect of section 1551
is to "curtail specialization along natural business lines and to discourage the volun-
tary breaking up of large enterprises into smaller entities." Emmanuel, Section 15(c):
'New Teeth For the Reluctant Dragon?, 8 TAx L. REv. 457 (1953). The author does
not explain how the transfer of assets to a wholly owned subsidiary, or an eighty
per cent owned subsidiary, is "voluntary breaking up." Certainly if the Buick Division
of General Motors Corporation were turned over to a new corporation wholly owned
by General Motors there would be no "breaking up" of the General Motors group.
82. See generally 7 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION ch. 88A (1956).
83. 296 U.S. 344 (1985).
84. Surrey, Tax Problems of Corporations & Shareholders, 14 TAx L. Rav. 1, 88
(1958).
[Vol. 44:485
19601 NOTE
can be argued that the association theory also could be used in a
parent-subsidiary case."5
Assuming that the association theory can be proved in a multiple
corporation situation-and this is a big assumption 8 6 -the result-ing income tax paid by the related group could be far greater than
that paid by a single corporation. It is clear, of course, that the gross
income of the component corporations would be aggregated and
against this only one surtax exemption allowed. However, there is
the problem of how to treat the component corporations. Should
they be disregarded or should they be recognized as taxable entities?
If recognized, then presumably their taxable income would be a
pro rata share of the net earnings of the association. If this is true,
then there would be triple taxation of the income earned by the
multiple corporate group; two corporate income taxes plus a per-
sonal tax on the dividends received from the component corporations
by their shareholders. Under this interpretation, an association of
ten component corporations could have a gross of $250,000 reduced
to $87,850 before distribution to the shareholders.
The triple taxation effect of the association theory could be
avoided by either of two approaches. The shareholders of the com-
ponent corporations could be considered as being directly associated,
85. This is probably due to the fact the brother-sister corporate group is often
used to work joint projects, such as in real estate developments where each corpo-
ration will handle a certain function or phase. One will hold title to the land, one
will build the houses, a third will sell the houses, etc. The corporations therefore have
agreements between them as to prices, profits, security, limitation of liability, control
or management, and so on. These agreements can be such that the six prerequisites
of Morrissey, or enough of them, will be present. Apparently, parent-subsidiary
groups are not commonly used to work joint projects, though they certainly could be.
86. For instance, how would the Commissioner prove that the title to the assets
is held by the association? In proving that a trust is an association, it is relatively easy
to do this, since the trust will hold title to the assets and it is the trust that is called
the association. Central management could be difficult to prove, unless one corpora-
tion is dominant, or one shareholder. And, if the component corporations are con-
sidered the members of the association, where is the ease of transferability of their
interests? They have no stock certificates, nor property rights'such as beneficiaries of
a trust have.
87. The association would pay $124,500 in taxes, leaving $125,500 for distribution.
Assuming equal distribution, each component corporation would receive $12,550, on
which each would pay $3,765 in taxes, a total of $37,650 for the ten corporations.
Subtracting this from the $125,500 distributed to the corporations, it means that only
$87,850 of the original $250,000 is left for distribution to the shareholders. Thus,
almost sixty-five per cent of the income would go for taxes. The harshness of this result
could be mitigated, or wholly eliminated, if the taxpayer could prevail with one of
two possible attacks. It would be mitigated substantially if the taxpayer success-
fully argues that each component of the association is entitled to the eighty-five
per cent dividend credit provided in section 243(a). The harshness would be elimi-
nated if the taxpayer successfully asserted that payments by the association to the
components were for services rendered to the association and the association is
therefore entitled to deduct these payments as "trade or business expenses" under
section 162. However, the latter point may be wholly or partially thwarted by the
Commissioner showing the deductions were excessive.
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therefore receiving the income, after taxes, of the association with-
out its going through the component corporations. Or, the Commis-
sioner could simply elect not to require the component corporations
to pay tax on the income "received" from the association. By avoid-
ing the harsh effects of taxation, these approaches would make the
association theory more acceptable to the courts, but the result of
both approaches is the disregarding of the component corporations
as taxable entities. Thus, under the guise of the association theory,
the sham theory would be applied in a situation where the corpo-
rations are actually performing business activity.
II. SoMm PossiLB APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF MUrTPLE
INCORPOBATION
With the exception of some of the recent cases, judicial construc-
tion of the Commissioner's statutory weapons has left him almost
powerless against a cleverly conceived multiple corporation device. 8
As pointed out in the beginning of this Note,89 the rewards for mul-
tiple incorporation are significant, and it would be naive to assume
they are not being sought after and obtained.90 This means that
some businesses are obtaining a competitive advantage, and that the
Internal Revenue Code is directly influencing that natural competi-
tive struggle basic to our economic systemY1 The policy of allowing
a person to reduce taxes by selection of any business form is thus out-
weighed by the desirability of preventing the tax code from creating,
or fostering, such unfair competitive advantages. Furthermore, as
indicated below, there is a danger that the surtax exemption and the
accumulated earnings credit will be lost because of the extensive
use of multiple incorporation.2 Therefore, the use of the multiple
corporate device should be limited. These desired limitations should
88. Section 1551 is effective but its area of application is limited. See note 77
supra.
89. See notes 3 through 6 supra and accompanying text.
90. Multiple incorporation has been termed one of the biggest "leaks" in the Code.
Mortenson, The Multiple Attack on Multiple Corporations, 35 TAxEs 647, 658 (1957).
91. Mr. Mortenson has indicated that it can be argued it is desirable to allow
multiple incorporation as an incentive to split-ups and new businesses. Ibid. This
would be consistent with Mr. Emmanuel's theory that section 1551 has a stifling
effect on the economy. See note 81 supra. The objection allowing unchecked multiple
incorporation is that the original purpose of the surtax exemption, a graduated in-
come tax that favors low-income corporations, would be destroyed. Through multiple
incorporations the effective tax on corporations would be almost equal to the "normal
tax" imposed by section 11. Thus, not only would there no longer be any "break"
given to the small corporations, but also there would be a significant loss of tax
revenue.
92. Professor Surrey has said that "the decision whether tax benefits should be
accorded small business may depend in considerable part on whether the benefits
may really be confined to small business." Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corpora-
tions and Shareholders, 14 TAx L. REv. 1, 88 (1958).
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be legislated, not judicially created. Judicial reconstruction of the
present theories and code sections, such as done in Aldon Homes,
Coastal Oil, Advance Machinery, Alpha Tank and James Realty,
could perhaps accomplish the desired result, but the change would
be too uncertain and too slow. Furthermore, it is questionable
whether courts should change well established interpretations of
statutory law, especially in an area like taxation where there is
constant revision of the statutes and there is a need for integration
of changes.
A. ELMINATION OF THE SURTAX EXEmPTION
AND ACCuMULATED EARNINGS CRDIT.
A solution that is appealing because of its simplicity is to elimi-
nate the accumulated earnings credit and the surtax exemption.
Deciding whether this should be done necessitates a balancing of
the purposes and effects of the two tax "breaks" against the evils of
multiple incorporations.
The accumulated earnings credit was inserted in the Code to
encourage expansion by small business. 3 It was thought that the
threat of the accumulated earnings tax would inhibit small corpora-
tions from accumulating any earnings for expansion purposes. Many
small corporations apparently believed they would not be able to
justify all the accumulated earnings and therefore might jeopardize
the entire accumulation. 4
The effect of the surtax exemption was to create a progressive
corporate tax rate, an expression of the theory of taxing according
to ability to pay. 5 This is consistent with taxation of individuals and
partnerships, and for this reason alone should be retained. The
standard reason given for the surtax exemption, however, is that it
aids "small business." 6 Also, the exemption aids the expansion of
existing businesses. A prosperous business may wish to diversify,
93. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1954); STAF
OF JorNT CoNa. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TA X T ON, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., PREnuan -
NARY SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERNAL REVENUE REVISION 65-66 (Comm. Print 1953).
94. STAFF OF Jon'T COMm. ON INTERNAL PEVENuE TAXATION, op. cit. supra note
93, at 66.
95. See SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1951); 83 CONG. REc.
4926 (1938); 83 CONG. REc. 2778 (1938).
96. Authorities cited note 95 supra. Defining "small business" is difficult. It could
be defined in terms of the number of shareholders, or the value of assets, the
volume of sales, etc. The Code's approach is in terms of income; every corporation
formed for a valid business purpose (of varying degrees) that has less than $25,000
taxable income is a "small business.
97. Your committee believes that the continuance of a free competitive market
demands the creation of new, and the growth of existing, small businesses and
that this necessitates preferential tax treatment with today's corporate tax
burden.
SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951).
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explore new areas, or open up new markets, but might hold back
because of the doubtful profits, or the fear of risking its assets. The
surtax exemption would aid these new offshoots, just as it is said
to aid new corporations." Since the economy benefits equally from
"offshoots" and "new starts," it is logical that each should receive
equal encouragement.
A possible answer to the argument that the surtax is necessary
to encourage new businesses is Subchapter S of the 1954 Code. It
allows certain small corporations to elect to be taxed in a manner
similar to a partnership. By exercising this option, the businesses that
qualify for Subchapter S could obtain a self-imposed graduated tax
rate. Overlooked by this Subchapter S theory is the fact many small
corporations are owned by too many people to qualify for Sub-
chapter S, and there are several types of corporations that could not
qualify for the election. Furthermore, there are other factors to be
considered, such as the requirement that the electing corporation
may have only one class of stock.99 These limitations on the applica-
tion of Subchapter S weaken the argument that small business would
not be hurt by the removal of the surtax exemption.
Thus, the appeal of eliminating the surtax exemption and accumu-
lated earnings credit loses its initial lustre on close inspection. The
results of their elimination are too harsh to justify this method as
an answer to the multiple incorporation problem.
B. USE OF ThE ASSOCrATION TI-EORY
There are three major objections to codifying the association
theory: 1) The association theory is in reality an extension of the
sham theory, and it would be better to use a more stringent version
of the familiar business purpose test than to strike down entities
through application of a new test with uncertain and complicated
concepts. 2) If the triple taxation results were incorporated in the
Code as part of the association theory, too severe a penalty would be
imposed on the shareholders of the component corporations. Even if
the association theory could somehow be made concrete and defi-
nite so that it could be predicted under what circumstances the
Commissioner would be successful, the penalty would be too harsh.
3) The association theory could easily be avoided since there are so
many prerequisites to its application.
98. Congress is aware of this, as evidenced by its concern that section 1551
should not be used to deny the exemption and credit in cases of legitimate expan-
sion. See note 81 supra.
99. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1871(a), 1872(e)(4), (5); Note, A Tax
Comparison of the Limited Partnership and the Subchapter S Corporation, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 964 (1959).
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C. OBJECTIVE TESTS
Professor Surrey and his American Law Institute group project
have expressed doubt that the subjective tax avoidance test is rele-
vant to the prevention of undesirable multiple incorporation. 100
Their position is that the surtax exemption and the accumulated
earnings credit should be "limited in accordance with the realities
of the situation and in the light of the purposes sought to be served
by the benefits involved in the exemption and credit." 101 Under their
view, the purpose of the exemption and credit is to aid "small busi-
ness." Accordingly, Professor Surrey and the A.L.I. group have
developed in their "working views" objective tests or definitions for
"small business." These tests are:
(2) A parent-subsidiary affiliated group should be treated as a unit .. .
and the group should be entitled only to a single exemption and credit.
The stock-ownership requirements respecting the consolidated return privi-
lege, 80 per cent at present, should apply in determining affiliation.
(8) A brother-sister group should also be treated as a unit . .. if there
is common shareholder ownership and if the business activities of the cor-
porations are conducted in an integrated manner.
(a) As respects the stock-ownership requirement, it would be satisfied
if at least 80 per cent of the common stock of each corporation is owned
by not more than five individuals in substantially the same proportion,
taling into account reciprocal stock ownership arrangements and rules
of stock attribution.
(b) As respects the integration of business-activities requirement, re-
gard should be paid to whether the corporations utilize common manage-
ment, sources of supply, and facilities, etc.; to whether there are
substantial intercorporate dealings, such as mutual financing or credit
arrangements; to whether the activities represent substantially a unitary
trade or business, and like factors.102
Professor Surrey would add these tests to the present weapons of the
Commissioner, retaining, for example, section 269 to deal with situa-
tions not covered by the new tests.10 3
Professor Surrey's tests are appealingly precise in their application.
If the objective criteria are met, the exemption and credit will be
limited accordingly. This is particularly true in the case of the
parent-subsidiary relationship, where the credit and exemption are
limited automatically after eighty per cent control is obtained. Al-
though the applicable test is not completely objective in the brother-
sister relationship, the proposed tests would at least give the Com-
missioner better legislative standards than presently exist.
100. Surrey, Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders, 14 TAx L. Rv. 1,
39 (1958).
101. Id. at 42.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
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However, two major objections to Professor Surrey's recommenda-
tions may arise from the inflexibility of the proposed objective tests.
First, in some respects, these tests do not go far enough and conse-
quently can easily be circumvented. For example, by reducing own-
ership to 793 per cent a parent-subsidiary group could avoid test
number two; and, by having six instead of five common shareholders
in a brother-sister group, test number three could be defeated. The
A.L.I. answer to this is retention of the present tax evasion sections,
which, as demonstrated, are probably powerless against multiple
incorporation. The result, therefore, would be continuation of judi-
cial legislation in regard to the present Code sections. Businessmen
would circumvent the objective tests, forcing the Commissioner to
rely on the present sections and hope for more decisions like lames
Realty, or for judicial acceptance of the association theory.
Second, in other respects, these A.L.I. proposals go too far and
interfere with the encouragement of expansion of business. The tests
are too restrictive to allow the surtax exemption and accumulated
earnings credit to effect their expansion purpose; 104 this is especially
true of the parent-subsidiary test.10 5 Congress, in enacting section
1551 to deal with parent-subsidiary multiple incorporation, made it
clear that the incentive to genuine expansion (as opposed to split-
ups) engendered by the surtax exemption and accumulated earn-
ings credit was not to be destroyed by section 1551.106 Therefore, it
is clear that Congress wants the surtax exemption and accumulated
earnings credit to remain as aids to expansion of business, and it is
equally demonstrable that the A.L.I. proposal will prevent them
from so doing.
D. SuBJEcTIVE TESTS
The answer, therefore, is a test that furthers the purposes ex-
pressed by Congress for the surtax exemption and the accumulated
earnings credit -fostering of new small businesses and encourage-
ment of expansion of existing businesses- and at the same time
prevents the use of the exemption and credit for purposes incon-
sistent with those expressed by Congress. This could best be ac-
complished by a subjective test, because a subjective test has
flexibility, which gives it an ability to adapt to the sophistication of
the problem.0 7
104. See notes 93-98 supra and accompanying text.
105. If a parent-subsidiary relationship exists, and there is eighty per cent control,
denial of all but one surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit is automatic.
106. See authority cited note 81 supra.
107. The argument for flexibility in a tax avoidance statute is clearly set forth in
this statement:
The line which section 855 draws between corporate separations that qualify
and those that do not is a good illustration of the inadequacy of a taxing statute
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Accordingly, the definition of what is a multiple corporate group
-the definition of the minimum relationship between corporations
which must exist before they will be examined for possible denial
of exemptions and credit-should be subjective. Such a definition
could be supplied by using the "actual controY' definition of sec-
tion 482.108 Professor Surrey's ideas of percentage of control and
number of shareholders common to the group could be added to
the test as guides to the Commissioner, though care should be ex-
ercised to point out that the Surrey tests should not be exclusive.
Once the multiple corporate group has been defined, the denial
of the exemptions and credits to some or all of the members of the
group should also be based on a subjective test. Congress has long
recognized the appropriateness of a subjective test for this purpose,
as evidenced by sections 269 and 1551; and the courts have read a
subjective test for tax avoidance into section 482.109 It is true that
these tests-which balance tax avoidance motives against business
purposes- are ineffective against multiple incorporation, but this
ineffectiveness is due to two things: the type of business purpose
looked to, and the amount required. The business purposes con-
sidered under these sections have been all-inclusive. To allow a
multiple corporate group to be justified by non-expansion purposes
is to allow the use of surtax exemptions and accumulated earnings
credits for purposes other than those intended by Congress. To
properly effectuate the congressional intent, the purposes looked
to should be those associated with the establishing or acquiring of
a business unrelated to the businesses of the existing multiple cor-
porate group.
The second reason for ineffectiveness of the present test, the small
amount of business purpose that has been allowed to justify multiple
incorporation, could be overcome in two ways. First, give the Com-
missioner discretionary power, as he now has under section 482, to
determine when a multiple group has not been established for busi-
ness expansion purposes. This would result in the taxpayer's having
which is over-specific and inflexible. While rules of thumb are convenient
measures for administrative officials and taxpayers, they should not entirely
displace standards under which the administrative officials and the courts have
enough room to carry into effect the underlying legislative policy.
Lyons, Some Problems in Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 12 TAx. L.
RLv. 12, 31 (1956).
One writer has concluded that a broad, discretionary tax avoidance section, based
on a business purpose test, has worked successfilly in Canada, and would probably
be the best solution in this country. Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess
Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 Hazv. L. Bxv. 196, 222-23
(1944). See also Rudick, The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance, 7 LAw
& Com'N n. PhoB. 243 (1940).
108. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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the burden of proving the Commissioner's determination of lack of
expansion purpose to be arbitrary and unreasonable.
Second, the amount of business expansion purpose required to
justify the formation of an additional corporation should be substan-
tial in relation to the size of the business presently being conducted
by the enterprise. This comparison could be facilitated by estimating
in dollar terms the value of business purposes. The answer to an ob-
jection that business purpose cannot be monetarily evaluated is that
businessmen invariably go through this process before deciding on
any change in their business; they estimate the net return antici-
pated from any transaction or undertaking before entering into it.
The result of requiring that business expansion purpose be sub-
stantial in relation to the size of the business is that a certain amount
of purpose may justify the addition of a corporation by a "small busi-
ness" but the same amount would not justify a similar addition by a
"big business."
If these recommendations were incorporated into a single section
of the Code, sections 269 and 1551 would no longer be needed for
an attack on multiple incorporation. Of course, section 269 would
still be retained and applied to acquisitions of tax benefits, such
as tax loss carry forwards and depreciation deductions. Further-
more, section 482 would be retained to maintain arms-length rela-
tions between related entities.
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